THE PRINCE
by Nicolo Machiavelli
Translated by W. K. Marriott
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CHAPTER XX
Are Fortresses, And Many Other
Things To Which Princes Often Resort, Advantageous Or Hurtful?
1. SOME princes, so as to hold
securely the state, have disarmed their subjects; others have kept
their subject towns by factions; others have fostered enmities
against themselves; others have laid themselves out to gain over
those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their governments;
some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and destroyed them.
And although one cannot give a final judgment on all one of these
things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which
a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as
comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit. (Note
1)
2. There never was a new prince who
has disarmed his subjects; rather when he has found them disarmed he
has always armed them, because, by arming them, those arms become
yours, those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who
were faithful are kept so, and your subjects become your adherents.
And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do
arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, and this
difference in their treatment, which they quite understand, makes
the former your dependants, and the latter, considering it to be
necessary that those who have the most danger and service should
have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at
once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for
cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions
breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it
follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character
already shown; even if they should be good they would not be
sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted
subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new
principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of
examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a
province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of
that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring
it; and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered
soft and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way
that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who
in your old state were living near you. (Note
2)
3. Our forefathers, and those who
were reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it was necessary to
hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses; and with this idea
they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary towns so as to
keep possession of them the more easily. This may have been well
enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but I do not
believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because I
do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is
certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are
quickly lost, because the weakest party will always assist the
outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The
Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the
Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and
although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they
nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted
by their differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we
saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the
rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state.
Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because these
factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality; such
methods for enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only
useful in times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves
fallacious. (Note
3)
4. Without doubt princes become
great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which
they are confronted, and therefore fortune, especially when she
desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater necessity to
earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise and form
designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of
overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which
his enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that a wise
prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some
animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown
may rise higher. (Note
4)
5. Princes, especially new ones,
have found more fidelity and assistance in those men who in the
beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the
beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled
his state more by those who had been distrusted than by others. But
on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much
with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who at the
commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a
description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be
gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to
serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very
necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he
had formed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit
from them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may
neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not
fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a
new state, that he must well consider the reasons which induced
those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural affection
towards him, but only discontent with their government, then he will
only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it
will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons
for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and
modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to
make friends of those men who were contented under the former
government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being
discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to
seize it. (Note 5)
6. It has been a custom with
princes, in order to hold their states more securely, to build
fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who might
design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first
attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of
formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times
has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so
that he might keep that state; Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on
returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare
Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that
province, and considered that without them it would be more
difficult to lose it; the Bentivoglio returning to Bologna came to a
similar decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according
to circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in
another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has
more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build
fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from
the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by
Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the
house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this
reason the best possible fortress is- not to be hated by the people,
because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not
save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting
foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It
has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use
to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli, when the Count
Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to
withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and
thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that
time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses
were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked
her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners.
Therefore it would have been safer for her, both then and before,
not to have been hated by the people than to have had the
fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him who
builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame
whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the
people. (Note 6)
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