THE PRINCE
by Nicolo Machiavelli
Translated by W. K. Marriott
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CHAPTER XIX
That One Should Avoid Being
Despised And Hated
NOW, concerning the characteristics
of which mention is made above, I have spoken of the more important
ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly under this generality,
that the prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how
to avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible; and
as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part,
and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches. (Note
1)
It makes him hated above all things,
as I have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the
property and women of his subjects, from both of which he must
abstain. And when neither their property nor honour is touched, the
majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with the
ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways. (Note
2)
It makes him contemptible to be
considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute,
from all of which a prince should guard himself as from a rock; and
he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness, courage,
gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his
subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and
maintain himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to
deceive him or to get round him. (Note
3)
That prince is highly esteemed who
conveys this impression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is
not easily conspired against; for, provided it is well known that he
is an excellent man and revered by his people, he can only be
attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to have two
fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from
without, on account of external powers. From the latter he is
defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is
well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain
quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they should have
been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs
outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has
lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist
every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.
But concerning his subjects, when
affairs outside are disturbed he has only to fear that they will
conspire secretly, from which a prince can easily secure himself by
avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping the people
satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to
accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most
efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is
not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires
against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but
when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he
will not have the courage to take such a course, for the
difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as
experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been
successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he
take a companion except from those whom he believes to be
malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a
malcontent you have given him the material with which to content
himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so
that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the
other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare
friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith
with you. (Note 4)
And, to reduce the matter into a
small compass, I say that, on the side of the conspirator, there is
nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him;
but on the side of the prince there is the majesty of the
principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to
defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular
goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to
conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before
the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the
sequel to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for
an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any escape. (Note
5)
Endless examples could be given on
this subject, but I will be content with one, brought to pass within
the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, who was
prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale), having been
murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one of
his family survived but Messer Giovanni, who was in childhood:
immediately after his assassination the people rose and murdered all
the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the house
of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great
that, although none remained there after the death of Annibale who
were able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having information that
there was one of the Bentivoglio family in Florence, who up to that
time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to Florence
for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was ruled
by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government.
For this reason I consider that a
prince ought to reckon conspiracies of little account when his
people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile to him, and bears
hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and everybody. And
well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care not to
drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied
and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a
prince can have. (Note
6)
Among the best ordered and governed
kingdoms of our times is France, and in it are found many good
institutions on which depend the liberty and security of the king;
of these the first is the parliament and its authority, because he
who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the nobility and
their boldness, considered that a bit in their mouths would be
necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the
hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished
to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the
particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach
which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the
people, and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an
arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour
the lesser without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a
better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of
security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw another
important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of
reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in
their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to
cherish the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the
people. (Note 7)
It may appear, perhaps, to some who
have examined the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors that many
of them would be an example contrary to my opinion, seeing that some
of them lived nobly and showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless
they have lost their empire or have been killed by subjects who have
conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these
objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors,
and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to
those alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for
consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies
the affairs of those times.
It seems to me sufficient to take
all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the
philosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcus and his son Commodus,
Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus,
Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
There is first to note that, whereas
in other principalities the ambition of the nobles and the insolence
of the people only have to be contended with, the Roman emperors had
a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and avarice
of their soldiers, a matter so beset with difficulties that it was
the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both
to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace, and for this
reason they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved
the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which
qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the
people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to their
greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were always
overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great authority,
and most of them, especially those who came new to the principality,
recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, were
inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about
injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes
cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place,
to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass
this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the
hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through
inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily to the
soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out advantageous
to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain
authority over them.
From these causes it arose that
Marcus, [Aurelius], Pertinax, and Alexander, being all men of modest
life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant,
came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died honoured,
because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and owed
nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being
possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept
both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated
nor despised.
But Pertinax was created emperor
against the wishes of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to live
licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the honest life to
which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given cause for
hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old age, he
was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And here
it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as
by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep
his state is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is
corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself- it may
be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles- you have to
submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will
do you harm. (Note
8)
But let us come to Alexander, who
was a man of such great goodness, that among the other praises which
are accorded him is this, that in the fourteen years he held the
empire no one was ever put to death by him unjudged; nevertheless,
being considered effeminate and a man who allowed himself to be
governed by his mother, he became despised, the army conspired
against him, and murdered him.
Turning now to the opposite
characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus,
you will find them all cruel and rapacious - men who, to satisfy
their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of iniquity
against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad end; but
in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers
friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned
successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight
of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way
astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And
because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish
to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the
lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince
to imitate. (Note
9)
Knowing the sloth of the Emperor
Julian, he persuaded the army in Sclavonia, of which he was captain,
that it would be right to go to Rome and avenge the death of
Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian soldiers; and under
this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the throne, he moved
the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known that he had
started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, elected
him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for Severus,
who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two
difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army,
had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west
where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he
considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he
decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he
wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to
share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and,
moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which
things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had
conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he
returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little
recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by
treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was
compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and
took from him his government and life. He who will, therefore,
carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a most
valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and
respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not
be wondered at that he, the new man, well, because his supreme
renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might
have conceived against him for his violence. (Note
10)
But his son Antoninus was a most
eminent man, and had very excellent qualities, which made him
admirable in the sight of the people and acceptable to the soldiers,
for he was a warlike man, most enduring of fatigue, a despiser of
all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused him to be beloved
by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties were so
great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he
killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of
Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by
those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in
the midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that
such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved
and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one
who does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear
them the less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful
not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around
him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care,
but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also
he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it
turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin. (Note
11)
But let us come to Commodus, to whom
it should have been very easy to hold the empire, for, being the son
of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had only to follow in the
footsteps of his father to please his people and soldiers; but,
being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to amusing the
soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his rapacity
upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity,
often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and
doing other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he
fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party
and despised by the other, he was conspired against and killed.
It remains to discuss the character
of Maximinus. He was a very warlike man, and the armies, being
disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of whom I have already
spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the throne. This he did
not possess for long, for two things made him hated and despised;
the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him into
contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great
indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession
to his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the
imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost
ferocity by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in
the empire, practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was
moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to fear at his
barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all the
people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may be
added his own army: this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting with
difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and
fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.
I do not wish to discuss
Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being thoroughly
contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this
discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have
this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers
in a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them
some indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have
armies that are veterans in the governance and administration of
provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it
was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to
the people, it is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk
and the Soldan, to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers,
because the people are the more powerful. (Note
12)
From the above I have excepted the
Turk, who always keeps round him twelve infantry and fifteen
thousand cavalry on which depend the security and strength of the
kingdom, and it is necessary that, putting aside every consideration
for the people, he should keep them his friends. The kingdom of the
Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of soldiers, follows
again that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his
friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan is unlike
all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the
Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary
or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old prince
not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who
have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this being an
ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, because
there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new
ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state
is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its
hereditary lord. (Note
13)
But returning to the subject of our
discourse, I say that whoever will consider it will acknowledge that
either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above-named
emperors, and it will be recognized also how it happened that, a
number of them acting in one way and a number in another, only one
in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones.
Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and
Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the
principality; and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to
Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they
not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his
footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot
imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow
those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts
which are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which
are proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable
and firm.
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