THE PRINCE
by Nicolo Machiavelli
Translated by W. K. Marriott
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CHAPTER XIII
Concerning Auxiliaries, Mixed
Soldiery, And One's Own
AUXILIARIES, which are the other
useless arm, are employed when a prince is called in with his forces
to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the most recent
times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor
proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with
Ferdinand, King of Spain, for his assistance with men and arms.
These arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who
calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for losing, one is
undone, and winning, one is their captive. (Note
1)
And although ancient histories may
be full of examples, I do not wish to leave this recent one of Pope
Julius II, the peril of which cannot fail to be perceived; for he,
wishing to get Ferrara, threw himself entirely into the hands of the
foreigner. But his good fortune brought about a third event, so that
he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; because, having
auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having risen and
driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and
others), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his
enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having
conquered by other arms than theirs. (Note
2)
The Florentines, being entirely
without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they
ran more danger than at any other time of their troubles.
The Emperor of Constantinople, to
oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on
the war being finished, were not willing to quit; this was the
beginning of the servitude of Greece to the infidels. (Note
3)
Therefore, let him who has no desire
to conquer make use of these arms, for they are much more hazardous
than mercenaries, because with them the ruin is ready made; they are
all united, all yield obedience to others; but with mercenaries,
when they have conquered, more time and better opportunities are
needed to injure you; they are not all of one community, they are
found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made their
head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure
you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in
auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided
these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to
lose with them than to conquer with others, not deeming that a real
victory which is gained with the arms of others. (Note
4)
I shall never hesitate to cite
Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered the Romagna with
auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, and with them he
captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not appearing
to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less danger in
them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on
handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he
destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one
and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers
the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had
the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied
on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and
found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than
when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces. (Note
5)
I was not intending to go beyond
Italian and recent examples, but I am unwilling to leave out Hiero,
the Syracusan, he being one of those I have named above. This man,
as I have said, made head of the army by the Syracusans, soon found
out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our Italian
condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could
neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces,
and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens. (Note
6)
I wish also to recall to memory an
instance from the Old Testament applicable to this subject. David
offered himself to Saul to fight with Goliath, the Philistine
champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him with his own
weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his back,
saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the
enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of
others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they
bind you fast. (Note
7)
Charles VII, the father of King
Louis XI, having by good fortune and valour liberated France from
the English, recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of
his own, and he established in his kingdom ordinances concerning
men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished
the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake,
followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that
kingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he
has entirely diminished the value of his own arms, for he has
destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he has
subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to
fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they can now
conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand
against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off
well against others. The armies of the French have thus become
mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms
together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries
alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces. And this example
proves it, the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the
ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.
But the scanty wisdom of man, on
entering into an affair which looks well at first, cannot discern
the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of hectic
fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize
evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this
insight is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Roman
Empire should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only
with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time the vigour
of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour which had
raised it passed away to others. (Note
8)
I conclude, therefore, that no
principality is secure without having its own forces; on the
contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the
valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always been
the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so
uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own
strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed either
of subjects, citizens, or dependants; all others are mercenaries or
auxiliaries. And the way to take ready one's own forces will be
easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon,
and if one will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the
Great, and many republics and princes have armed and organized
themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself. (Note
9)
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