THE PRINCE
by Nicolo Machiavelli
Translated by W. K. Marriott
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CHAPTER IX
Concerning A Civil Principality
BUT coming to the other point- where
a leading citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by
wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his
fellow citizens- this may be called a civil principality: nor is
genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a
happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is obtained
either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles.
Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from
this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed
by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people;
and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of
three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy. (Note
1)
A principality is created either by
the people or by the nobles, accordingly as one or other of them has
the opportunity; for the nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the
people, begin to cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and
they make him a prince, so that under his shadow they can give vent
to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist the
nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and make
him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains
sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with
more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people,
because the former finds himself with many around him who consider
themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor
manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular
favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are
not prepared to obey him. (Note
2)
Besides this, one cannot by fair
dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you
can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that
of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, whilst the former only
desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also that a prince can
never secure himself against a hostile people, because of their
being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as
they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a
hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles
he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise
against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and
astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to
obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the
prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can
do well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them
daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him. (Note
3)
Therefore, to make this point
clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be looked at mainly in two
ways: that is to say, they either shape their course in such a way
as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do not. Those who so
bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured and
loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two
ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural
want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,
especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in
prosperity you honour yourself, in adversity you have not to fear
them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding
themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to
themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard against such,
and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity
they always help to ruin him. (Note
4)
Therefore, one who becomes a prince
through the favour of the people ought to keep them friendly, and
this he can easily do seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by
him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes a prince by
the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to win
the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes
them under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from
him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to
their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted to him
than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours; and
the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary
according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I
omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the
people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity. (Note
5)
Nabis, Prince of the Spartans,
sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious Roman army,
and against them he defended his country and his government; and for
the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make
himself secure against a few, but this would not have been
sufficient if the people had been hostile. And do not let any one
impugn this statement with the trite proverb that 'He who builds on
the people, builds on the mud,' for this is true when a private
citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the
people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the
magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as
happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali in
Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above,
who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity,
who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his
resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged - such a
one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown
that he has laid his foundations well. (Note
6)
These principalities are liable to
danger when they are passing from the civil to the absolute order of
government, for such princes either rule personally or through
magistrates. In the latter case their government is weaker and more
insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those
citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in
troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either
by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid
tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and
subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of
a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be
in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a
prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when
citizens had need of the state, because then every one agrees with
him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish
to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of
its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this
experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once.
Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his
citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have
need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them
faithful. (Note 7)
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