THE PRINCE
by Nicolo Machiavelli
Translated by W. K. Marriott
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CHAPTER III
Concerning Mixed Principalities
BUT the difficulties occur in a new
principality. And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it
were, a member of a state which, taken collectively, may be called
composite, the changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which
there is in all new principalities; for men change their rulers
willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to
take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because
they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse.
This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which
always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him
with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put
upon his new acquisition. (Note
1)
In this way you have enemies in all
those whom you have injured in seizing that principality, and you are
not able to keep those friends who put you there because of your not
being able to satisfy them in the way they expected, and you cannot
take strong measures against them, feeling bound to them. For,
although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a
province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives. (Note
2)
For these reasons Louis XII, King of
France, quickly occupied Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn
him out the first time it only needed Lodovico's own forces; because
those who had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in
their hopes of future benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of
the new prince. It is very true that, after acquiring rebellious
provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards,
because the prince, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity of
the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects,
and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause France
to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico to
raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a
second time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and
that his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which
followed from the causes above mentioned. (Note
3)
Nevertheless Milan was taken from
France both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the
first have been discussed; it remains to name those for the second,
and to see what resources he had, and what any one in his situation
would have had for maintaining himself more securely in his
acquisition than did the King of France.
Now I say that those dominions which,
when acquired, are added to an ancient state by him who acquires them,
are either of the same country and language, or they are not. When
they are, it is easier to hold them, especially when they have not
been accustomed to self-government; and to hold them securely it is
enough to have destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling them;
because the two peoples, preserving in other things the old
conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly
together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and
Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,
although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the
customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on
amongst themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold
them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the
family of their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither
their laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time
they will become entirely one body with the old principality. (Note
4)
But when states are acquired in a
country differing in language, customs, or laws, there are
difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold
them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be that he who
has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make his
position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in
Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for
holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been
able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as
they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at
hand, they heard of only when they are one can no longer remedy them.
Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials; the
subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing
to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be
otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state from the
outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince resides
there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty. (Note
5)
The other and better course is to send
colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for
it necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of
cavalry and infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for
with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there,
and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes
lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom
he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure
him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the
same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as
it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that
these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure
less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered,
cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be
well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter
injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that
is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not
stand in fear of revenge. (Note
6)
But in maintaining armed men there in
place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the
garrison all income from the state, so that the acquisition turns into
a loss, and many more are exasperated, because the whole state is
injured; through the shifting of the garrison up and down all become
acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies
who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For
every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is
useful. (Note 7)
Again, the prince who holds a country
differing in the above respects ought to make himself the head and
defender of his powerful neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful
amongst them, taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himself
shall, by any accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen
that such a one will be introduced by those who are discontented,
either through excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen
already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in
every other country where they obtained a footing they were brought in
by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon
as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are
drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling
power. So that in respect to these subject states he has not to take
any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them
quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to
take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much
authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he
can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain
entirely master in the country. And he who does not properly manage
this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does
hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles. (Note
8)
The Romans, in the countries which
they annexed, observed closely these measures; they sent colonies and
maintained friendly relations with the minor powers, without
increasing their strength; they kept down the greater, and did not
allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece appears to
me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Aetolians were kept
friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was
driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never secured
for them permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions
of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends without first
humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agree that
he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the Romans did
in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, who have to
regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they
must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to
remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no
longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens
in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the
beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect,
but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated
in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure.
Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise
have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they
can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen,
they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them.
there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing
troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not
let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided,
but is only put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished
to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do
it in Italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish;
nor did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the
wise ones of our time:- Let us enjoy the benefits of the time- but
rather the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives
everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as
evil, and evil as well as good. (Note
9)
But let us turn to France and inquire
whether she has done any of the things mentioned. I will speak of
Louis [XII] (and not of Charles [VIII]) as the one whose conduct is
the better to be observed, he having held possession of Italy for the
longest period; and you will see that he has done the opposite to
those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of
divers elements.
King Louis was brought into Italy by
the ambition of the Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of
Lombardy by his intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the
king, because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy, and having no
friends there - seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to
the conduct of Charles - he was forced to accept those friendships
which he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his
design if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king,
however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority
which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his
friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio,
my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of
Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchesi, the Pisans, the Sienese-
everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could the
Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in
order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king
master of two-thirds of Italy.
Let any one now consider with what
little difficulty the king could have maintained his position in Italy
had he observed the rules above laid down, and kept all his friends
secure and protected; for although they were numerous they were both
weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and
thus they would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by
their means he could easily have made himself secure against those who
remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the
contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never
occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself,
depriving himself of friends and those who had thrown themselves into
his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much temporal
power to the spiritual, thus giving it great authority. And having
committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so
that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his
becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into
Italy. (Note 10)
And as if it were not enough to have
aggrandized the Church, and deprived himself friends, he, wishing to
have the kingdom of Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and
where he was the prime arbiter of Italy he takes an associate, so that
the ambitious of that country and the malcontents of his own should
have where to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom
his own pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was
able to drive him, Louis, out in turn. (Note
11)
The wish to acquire is in truth very
natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this
they will be praised not blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish
to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if
France could have attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to
have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have divided it.
And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was
justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this
other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that
necessity. (Note
12)
Therefore Louis made these five
errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he increased the strength of
one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he
did not settle in the country, he did not send colonies. Which errors,
if he had lived, were not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth
by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not
aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have
been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first
taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for
they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs
on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except
to become masters themselves there; also because the others would not
wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the
Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the
courage. (Note 13)
And if any one should say: King Louis
yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid
war, I answer for the reasons given above that a blunder ought never
be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is
only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another should allege the
pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would assist him
in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and
for the hat to Rouen, to that I reply what I shall write later on
concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept. (Note
14)
Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not
having followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken
possession of countries and wished to retain them. Nor is there any
miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on
these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino,
as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually called,
occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the
Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French did
not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have
allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been
seen that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been
caused by France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a
general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the
cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that
predominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else by
force, and both are distrusted by him who has been raised to power. (Note
15)
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