I have been well accustomed these past days to
detach my mind from my senses, and I have accurately
observed that there are very few things that one
knows with certainty respecting corporeal objects,
that there are many more which are known to us
respecting the human mind, and yet more still
regarding God Himself; so that I shall now without any difficulty
abstract my thoughts from the consideration of
[sensible or] imaginable objects, and carry them
to those which, being withdrawn from all contact
with matter, are purely intelligible. (Note
1) And certainly the idea which I possess of
the human mind inasmuch as it is a thinking thing,
and not extended in length, width and depth, nor
participating in anything pertaining to body, is
incomparably more distinct than is the idea of any
corporeal thing. And when I
consider that I doubt, that is to say, that I am
an incomplete and dependent being, the idea of a
being that is complete and independent, that is of
God, presents itself to my mind with so much
distinctness and clearness -- and from the fact
alone that this idea is found in me, or that I who
possess this idea exist, I conclude so certainly
that God exists, and that my existence depends
entirely on Him in every moment of my life -- that
I do not think that the human mind is capable of
knowing anything with more evidence and certitude.
(Note 2) And
it seems to me that I now have before me a road
which will lead us from the contemplation of the
true God (in whom all the treasures of science and
wisdom are contained) to the knowledge of the other
objects of the universe.
For, first of all, I recognise it to be impossible
that He should ever deceive me; for in all fraud
and deception some imperfection is to be found,
and although it may appear that the power of
deception is a mark of subtilty or power, yet the
desire to deceive without doubt testifies to
malice or feebleness, and accordingly cannot be
found in God. (Note 3)
In the next place I
experienced in myself a certain capacity for judging
which I have doubtless received from God, like all
the other things that I possess; and as He could not
desire to deceive me, it is clear that He has not
given me a faculty that will lead me to err if I use
it aright.
And no doubt respecting
this matter could remain, if it were not that the
consequence would seem to follow that I can thus
never be deceived; for if I hold all that I possess
from God, and if He has not placed in me the
capacity for error, it seems as though I could never
fall into error. And it is true that when I think
only of God [and direct my mind wholly to Him],18
I discover [in myself] no cause of error, or
falsity; yet directly afterwards, when recurring to
myself, experience shows me that I am nevertheless
subject to an infinitude of errors, as to which,
when we come to investigate them more closely, I
notice that not only is there a real and positive
idea of God or of a Being of supreme perfection
present to my mind, but also, so to speak, a certain
negative idea of nothing, that is, of that which is
infinitely removed from any kind of perfection; and
that I am in a sense something intermediate between
God and nought, i.e. placed in such a manner between
the supreme Being and non-being, that there is in
truth nothing in me that can lead to error in so far
as a sovereign Being has formed me; but that, as I
in some degree participate likewise in nought or in
non-being, i.e. in so far as I am not myself the
supreme Being, and as I find myself subject to an
infinitude of imperfections, I ought not to be
astonished if I should fall into error. Thus do I
recognise that error, in so far as it is such, is
not a real thing depending on God, but simply a
defect; and therefore, in order to fall into it,
that I have no need to possess a special faculty
given me by God for this very purpose, but that I fall into error from the fact
that the power given me by God for the purpose of
distinguishing truth from error is not infinite.
(Note
4)
Nevertheless this does
not quite satisfy me; for error is not a pure
negation [i.e. is not the dimple defect or want of
some perfection which ought not to be mine], but it
is a lack of some knowledge which it seems that I
ought to possess. And on considering the nature of
God it does not appear to me possible that He should
have given me a faculty which is not perfect of its
kind, that is, which is wanting in some perfection
due to it. For if it is true that the more skilful
the artizan, the more perfect is the work of his
hands, what can have been produced by this supreme
Creator of all things that is not in all its parts
perfect? And certainly there
is no doubt that God could have created me so that
I could never have been subject to error; it is
also certain that He ever wills what is best; is
it then better that I should be subject to err
than that I should not? (Note 5)
In
considering this more attentively, it occurs to me
in the first place that I should not be astonished
if my intelligence is not capable of comprehending
why God acts as He does; and that there is thus no
reason to doubt of His existence from the fact
that I may perhaps find many other things besides
this as to which I am able to understand neither
for what reason nor how God has produced them.
(Note
6) For, in the first place, knowing that
my nature is extremely feeble and limited, and that
the nature of God is on the contrary immense,
incomprehensible, and infinite, I have no further
difficulty in recognising that there is an
infinitude of matter in His power, the causes of
which transcend my knowledge; and this reason
suffices to convince me that the species of cause
termed final, finds no useful employment in physical
[or natural] things; for it does not appear to me
that I can without temerity seek to investigate the
[inscrutable] ends of God.
It further occurs to me
that we should not consider one single creature
separately, when we inquire as to whether the works
of God are perfect, but should regard all his
creations together. For the same thing which might
possibly seem very imperfect with some semblance of
reason if regarded by itself, is found to be very
perfect if regarded as part of the whole universe;
and although, since I resolved to doubt all things,
I as yet have only known certainly my own existence
and that of God, nevertheless since I have
recognised the infinite power of God, I cannot deny
that He may have produced many other things, or at
least that He has the power of producing them, so
that I may obtain a place as a part of a great
universe.
Whereupon, regarding
myself more closely, and considering what are my errors (for they alone testify
to there being any imperfection in me), I
answer that they depend on a
combination of two causes, to wit, on the faculty
of knowledge that rests in me, and on the power of
choice or of free will (Note 7)
-- that is to say, of the understanding and at the
same time of the will. For by the understanding
alone I [neither assert nor deny anything, but]
apprehend19 the ideas of things as to
which I can form a judgment. But no error is
properly speaking found in it, provided the word
error is taken in its proper signification; and
though there is possibly an infinitude of things in
the world of which I have no idea in my
understanding, we cannot for all that say that it is
deprived of these ideas [as we might say of
something which is required by its nature], but
simply it does not possess these; because in truth
there is no reason to prove that God should have
given me a greater faculty of knowledge than He has
given me; and however skillful
a workman I represent Him to be, I should not for
all that consider that He was bound to have placed
in each of His works all the perfections which He
may have been able to place in some.
(Note
8) I likewise cannot complain that God has not
given me a free choice or a will which is
sufficient, ample and perfect, since as a matter of
fact I am conscious of a will so extended as to be
subject to no limits. And what seems to me very
remarkable in this regard is that of all the
qualities which I possess there is no one so perfect
and so comprehensive that I do not very clearly
recognise that it might be yet greater and more
perfect. For, to take an example, if I consider the faculty of
comprehension which I possess, I find that it is
of very small extent and extremely limited
(Note
9) , and at the same time I find the idea of
another faculty much more ample and even infinite,
and seeing that I can form the idea of it, I
recognise from this very fact that it pertains to
the nature of God. If in the same way I examine the
memory, the imagination, or some other faculty, I do
not find any which is not small and circumscribed,
while in God it is immense [or infinite]. It is free-will alone or liberty
of choice which I find to be so great in me that I
can conceive no other idea to be more great; it is
indeed the case that it is for the most part this
will that causes me to know that in some manner I
bear the image and similitude of God.
(Note 11)
For although the power of will is incomparably
greater in God than in me, both by reason of the
knowledge and the power which, conjoined with it,
render it stronger and more efficacious, and by
reason of its object, inasmuch as in God it extends
to a great many things; it nevertheless does not
seem to me greater if I consider it formally and
precisely in itself: for the
faculty of will consists alone in our having the
power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to
do it (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or to
shun it), or rather it consists alone in the fact
that in order to affirm or deny, pursue or shun
those things placed before us by the
understanding, we act so that we are unconscious
that any outside force constrains us in doing so.
For in order that I should be free it is not
necessary that I should be indifferent as to the
choice of one or the other of two contraries; but
contrariwise the more I lean to the one
(Note 12)
-- whether I recognise clearly that the reasons of
the good and true are to be found in it, or whether
God so disposes my inward thought -- the more freely
do I choose and embrace it. And undoubtedly both
divine grace and natural knowledge, far from
diminishing my liberty, rather increase it and
strengthen it. Hence this
indifference which I feel, when I am not swayed to
one side rather than to the other by lack of
reason, is the lowest grade of liberty, and rather
evinces a lack or negation in knowledge than a
perfection of will: for if I always recognised
clearly what was true and good, I should never
have trouble in deliberating as to what judgment
or choice I should make, and then I should be
entirely free without ever being indifferent.
(Note 13)
From
all this I recognise that the power of will which
I have received from God is not of itself the
source of my errors -- for it is very ample and
very perfect of its kind -- any more than is the
power of understanding; for since I understand
nothing but by the power which God has given me
for understanding, there is no doubt that all that
I understand, I understand as I ought, and it is
not possible that I err in this. Whence then come
my errors? They come from the sole fact that since
the will is much wider in its range and compass
than the understanding, I do not restrain it
within the same bounds, but extend it also to
things which I do not understand: and as the will
is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls
into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the
good, or the false for the true. (Note
14)
For
example, when I lately examined whether anything
existed in the world, and found that from the very
fact that I considered this question it followed
very clearly that I myself existed, I could not
prevent myself from believing that a thing I so
clearly conceived was true: not that I found
myself compelled to do so by some external cause,
but simply because from great clearness in my mind
there followed a great inclination of my will
(Note 15) ; and I believed this with
so much the greater freedom or spontaneity as I
possessed the less indifference towards it. Now, on the contrary, I not only
know that I exist, inasmuch as I am a thinking
thing, but a certain representation of corporeal
nature is also presented to my mind; and it comes
to pass that I doubt whether this thinking nature
which is in me, or rather by which I am what I am,
differs from this corporeal nature, or whether
both are not simply the same thing; and I here
suppose that I do not yet know any reason to
persuade me to adopt the one belief rather than
the other. From this it follows that I am entirely
indifferent as to which of the two I affirm or
deny (Note 16) ,
or even whether I abstain from forming any judgment
in the matter.
And
this indifference does not only extend to matters
as to which the understanding has no knowledge,
but also in general to all those which are not
apprehended with perfect clearness at the moment
when the will is deliberating upon them: for,
however probable are the conjectures which render
me disposed to form a judgment respecting
anything, the simple knowledge that I have that
those are conjectures alone and not certain and
indubitable reasons, suffices to occasion me to
judge the contrary. Of this I have had great
experience of late when I set aside as false all
that I had formerly held to be absolutely true,
for the sole reason that I remarked that it might
in some measure be doubted. (Note 17)
But
if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing
when I do not perceive it with sufficient
clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act
rightly and am not deceived. But if I determine to
deny or affirm, I no longer make use as I should
of my free will, and if I affirm what is not true,
it is evident that I deceive myself; even though I
judge according to truth, this comes about only by
chance, and I do not escape the blame of misusing
my freedom; for the light of nature teaches us
that the knowledge of the understanding should
always precede the determination of the will. (Note
18) And it is in the misuse of the free will
that the privation which constitutes the
characteristic nature of error is met with.
Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as
it proceeds from me, but it is not found in the
faculty which I have received from God, nor even in
the act in so far as it depends on Him.
For I have certainly no cause to
complain that God has not given me an intelligence
which is more powerful, or a natural light which
is stronger than that which I have received from
Him, since it is proper to the finite
understanding not to comprehend a multitude of
things, and it is proper to a created
understanding to be finite (Note 19)
; on the contrary, I have every reason to render
thanks to God who owes me nothing and who has given
me all the perfections I possess, and I should be
far from charging Him with injustice, and with
having deprived me of, or wrongfully withheld from
me, these perfections which He has not bestowed upon
me.
I have further no
reason to complain that He has given me a will more
ample than my understanding, for since the will consists only of one
single element, and is so to speak indivisible
(Note 20) ,
it appears that its nature is such that nothing can
be abstracted from it [without destroying it]; and
certainly the more comprehensive it is found to be,
the more reason I have to render gratitude to the
giver.
And, finally, I must
also not complain that God concurs with me in
forming the acts of the will, that is the judgment
in which I go astray, because these acts are
entirely true and good, inasmuch as they depend on
God; and in a certain sense more perfection accrues
to my nature from the fact that I can form them,
than if I could not do so. As to the privation in
which alone the formal reason of error or sin
consists, it has no need of any concurrence from
God, since it is not a thing [or an existence], and
since it is not related to God as to a cause, but
should be termed merely a negation [according to the
significance given to these words in the Schools].
For in fact it is not an
imperfection in God that He has given me the
liberty to give or withhold my assent from certain
things as to which He has not placed a clear and
distinct knowledge in my understanding; but it is
without doubt an imperfection in me not to make a
good use of my freedom, and to give my judgment
readily on matters which I only understand
obscurely. I nevertheless perceive that God could
easily have created me so that I never should err,
although I still remained free, and endowed with a
limited knowledge, viz. by giving to my
understanding a clear and distinct intelligence of
all things as to which I should ever have to
deliberate; or simply by His engraving deeply in
my memory the resolution never to form a judgment
on anything without having a clear and distinct
understanding of it, so that I could never forget
it. And it is easy for me to understand that, in
so far as I consider myself alone, and as if there
were only myself in the world, I should have been
much more perfect than I am, if God had created me
so that I could never err. Nevertheless I cannot
deny that in some sense it is a greater perfection
in the whole universe that certain parts should
not be exempt from error as others are than that
all parts should be exactly similar. And I have no
right to complain if God, having placed me in the
world, has not called upon me to play a part that
excels all others in distinction and perfection.
(Note 21)
And further I have
reason to be glad on the ground that if He has not
given me the power of never going astray by the
first means pointed out above, which depends on a
clear and evident knowledge of all the things
regarding which I can deliberate, He has at least left within my
power the other means, which is firmly to adhere
to the resolution never to give judgment on
matters whose truth is not clearly known to me;
for although I notice a certain weakness in my
nature in that I cannot continually concentrate my
mind on one single thought, I can yet, by
attentive and frequently repeated meditation,
impress it so forcibly on my memory that I shall
never fail to recollect it whenever I have need of
it, and thus acquire the habit of never going
astray. (Note 22)
And inasmuch as it is
in this that the greatest and principal perfection
of man consists, it seems to me that I have not
gained little by this day's Meditation, since I have
discovered the source of falsity and error. And
certainly there can be no other source than that
which I have explained; for as
often as I so restrain my will within the limits
of my knowledge that it forms no judgment except
on matters which are clearly and distinctly
represented to it by the understanding, I can
never be deceived; for every clear and distinct
conception20 is without doubt
something, and hence cannot derive its origin from
what is nought, but must of necessity have God as
its author -- God, I say, who being supremely
perfect, cannot be the cause of any error; and
consequently we must conclude that such a
conception [or such a judgment] is true.
(Note 23)
Nor have I only learned to-day what I should avoid
in order that I may not err, but also how I should
act in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth;
for without doubt I shall arrive at this end if I
devote my attention sufficiently to those things
which I perfectly understand; and if I separate from
these that which I only understand confusedly and
with obscurity. To these I shall henceforth
diligently give heed.
last update: Jun 23 2003