Rara temporum felicitas,
ubi sentire quae velis;
& quae sentia, dicere licet. [0]
-- Tacit
ADVERTISEMENT.
My design in the present
work is sufficiently explained in the Introduction. The reader must
only observe, that all the subjects I have there planned out to myself,
are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the
Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by
themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural
division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good
fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of
Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of
Human Nature. [1] The
approbation of the public I consider as the
greatest reward of my labours; but am determined to regard its
judgment, whatever it be, as my best instruction. [2]
INTRODUCTION.
Nothing is more usual and
more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the
world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of
their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced
before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that
ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions,
that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who
have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree
with them. [3] It is
easy for
one of judgment and learning, to perceive
the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the
greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate
and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences
lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of
evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the
systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn
disgrace upon philosophy itself. [4]
Nor is there required such
profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the
sciences, but even the rabble without doors may judge from the noise
and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is
nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of
learning are not of contrary opinions. [5] The most trivial
question
escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able
to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every
thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest
warmth, as if every thing was certain. [6] Amidst all this
bustle it is
not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs
ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis,
who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The
victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the
sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. [7]
From hence in my opinion
arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all
kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a
just value for every other part of literature. [8] By metaphysical
reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of
science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and
requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our
labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without
hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and
delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And
indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great
degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if
truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it
must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it
without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost
pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I
pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold,
and would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very
easy and obvious. [9]
It is evident, that all the
sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature: and that
however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return
back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy,
and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of
MAN; since the lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by
their powers and faculties. [10]
It is impossible to tell what changes
and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly
acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and could
explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we
perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be
hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us
in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to
their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and
consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but
also one of the objects, concerning which we reason. [11]
If therefore the sciences of
Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a
dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other
sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate?
The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of
our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and
criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men
as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four
sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended
almost everything, which it can any way import us to be acquainted
with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the
human mind. [12]
Here then is the only
expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical
researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have
hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or
village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center
of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of,
we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we
may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately
concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover
more fully those, which are the objects of pore curiosity. There is no
question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in the science
of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty,
before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending,
therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect
propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost
entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any
security. [13]
And as the science of man is
the-only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid
foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on
experience and observation. [14]
It is no astonishing reflection to
consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral
subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a
whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same
interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from
THALES to SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt,
my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers [Mr. Locke, my Lord
Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, etc.] in
England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and
have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So
true it is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and
excel us in some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and
philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty. [15]
Nor ought we to think, that
this latter improvement in the science of man will do less honour to
our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought
rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account of the greater
importance of that science, as well as the necessity it lay under of
such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the
mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must
be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities
otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation
of those particular effects, which result from its different
circumstances and situations. And though we must endeavour to render
all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our
experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest
and fewest causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience;
and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original
qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as
presumptuous and chimerical. [16]
I do not think a
philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the
ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in
that very science of human nature, which he pretends to explain, or
very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of man. For
nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same effect
upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the
impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself
vanishes. [17] When
we see,
that we have arrived at the utmost extent
of human reason, we sit down contented, though we be perfectly
satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give
no reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside our
experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar,
and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most
particular and most extraordinary phaenomenon. And as this
impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the
reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the
free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding
that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their
conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain
principles. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be
obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not what more we can
require of our philosophy.
But if this impossibility of
explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the
science of man, I will venture to affirm, that it is a defect common to
it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ
ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the
philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest artizans. None
of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are
not founded on that authority. [18]
Moral philosophy has, indeed, this
peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in
collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with
premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning
every particular difficulty which may be. When I am at a loss to know
the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put
them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I
endeavour to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral
philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I
consider, it is evident this reflection and premeditation would so
disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it
impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must
therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious
observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common
course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in
their pleasures. [19]
Where
experiments of this kind are judiciously
collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science
which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in
utility to any other of human comprehension.
First:
February 10, 2015
Last: February 12, 2015
