Note 1:
In such ways he
acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was
thoroughly safe and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a
light heart, and benevolent wishes for the success of the exiles
in their strange new home that was to be; and he got his
insurance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales.
Of course, the point of this introductory
paragraph is in this last sentence, and the weight lies at two
places: "In
such ways he acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction"
- which were irrational and unreasonable ways of arriving at a
convinction, and the last part, what the conviction thus reached
practically was in aid of: "he
got his insurance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told
no tales".
And the general assumptions Clifford here
seems to make may be stated as follows:
- Any belief a person has may have been
founded rationally and reasonably or not.
- If a belief is founded rationally, it
is consistent and based on real evidence.
- If a belief is founded reasonably, the
amount and quality of the evidence is proportionate to the
importance of the belief.
The first point is a mere matter of logic,
but if it is to make a real difference we must also presume that
- normally and usually people are free to
make up their own minds by gathering evidence and reasoning on
the basis of that.
The second point lays briefly down what it
is for a belief to be called rational: It must be
consistent (for an inconsistent set of beliefs is always false)
and it must be based on real evidence - statements of fact or
logic that other persons can test the validity of in terms of
principles that are intersubjectively and logically valid.
What "intersubjectively
and logically valid" means or should mean is again a difficult
question, but the underlying point is clear enough: There is no
ground for intellectual agreement or disagreement between people
without some agreed standards to judge statements.
The third point lays briefly down what it
is for a belief to be reasonable: The evidence one has for
it is proportionate to the importance one attributes to it.
Thus, if one believes that a certain
belief - whatever it is - is important one should, if one holds
the belief in a reasonable manner, have a lot of evidence for or
against it, and if one believes a certain belief is not important
one need have little evidence for it.
Text.
Note 2:
What shall we say of him? Surely this, that
he was verily guilty of the death of those men. It is admitted
that he did sincerely believe in the soundness of his ship; but
the sincerity of his conviction can in no wise help him, because
he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him.
He had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient
investigation, but by stifling his doubts. And although in the end
he may have felt so sure about it that he could not think
otherwise, yet inasmuch as he had knowingly and willingly worked
himself into that frame of mind, he must be held responsible for
it.
Here we have to make a small proviso in
judging him "verily
guilty of the death of those men", namely that indeed the
ship went down because measures its owner could and should have
taken given such knowledge as he had about the ship, but did not
take, and not for reasons having nothing to do with the fact that
these measures had not been taken.
There are two important claims here.
First: "the
sincerity of his conviction can in no wise help him, because he
had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him."
This is an important point because the
faithful and fanatics of all beliefs, creeds and political
convictions believe quite otherwise, namely that something is
true and important because they strongly feel and believe it is,
usually because they also believe that what they believe is true
and important will serve their interests.
In brief: Neither sincerity, nor strength,
nor conviction are in any way sufficient to make a belief
rational. What makes a belief rational is only its logical
relation to evidence. And indeed, it should be minimally such
as to be more probable than not given such the evidence one has, as this
would be judged by impartial rational men who are at least as
intelligent and as well-informed as oneself is.
Second: "he
may have felt so sure about it that he could not think otherwise,
yet inasmuch as he had knowingly and willingly worked himself into
that frame of mind, he must be held responsible for it."
Here I think a proviso must be made that
relates to human weaknesses: One's responsibility for one's own
opinions is indeed one's own, but it is also commensurate with
one's intelligence and courage. Some people are just not capable
of seeing certain rational inferences others see clearly, and some
people just do not have the courage to entertain the convictions
they reached.
Text.
Note 3: "When
an action is once done, it is right or wrong for ever; no
accidental failure of its good or evil fruits can possibly alter
that."
The reasons are, first, that in the end
one acts in a here and now for such reasons as one here and now
has, and this will be so for all times that follows it, regardless
of however better or other those later times are informed, and
second, that acts should not be judged by their outcomes, but by
their reasons, for one has control over one's reasoning but not
over the world, or only to such extent as one reasons truly about
it and has power to act and interfere. Text.
Note 4: "The
question of right or wrong has to do with the origin of his
belief, not the matter of it; not what it was, but how he got it;
not whether it turned out to be true or false, but whether he had
a right to believe on such evidence as was before him."
Put otherwise: A belief is right or wrong
not because it turns out to be true or false, but because it was
reached or not by a rational argument on the basis of evidence,
and because such evidence as one had gathered was reasonable in being
proportionate to the importance attributed to the belief. Text.
Note 5: "There
was once an island in which some of the inhabitants professed a
religion teaching neither the doctrine of original sin nor that of
eternal punishment."
Here it should be remarked that W.K.
Clifford lived on an island (England) where most inhabitants in
fact did profess a religion teaching both the doctrine of original
sin and of eternal punishment, and that he very probably believed
none of it.
I quote from
the article on Clifford on the excellent site on
mathematicians by St. Andrews University:
Macfarlane (..) tells us
that
he was eccentric in
appearance, habits and opinions.
Text.
Note 6: "For
although they had sincerely and conscientiously believed in the
charges they had made, yet they had no right to believe on such
evidence as was before them. Their sincere convictions,
instead of being honestly earned by patient inquiring, were stolen
by listening to the voice of prejudice and passion."
Put otherwise: There is a right to believe
- but it is strongly dependent on patient, rational inquiry, and
easily disqualified by passion or prejudice. Text.
Note 7: "Let
us vary this case also, and suppose, other things remaining as
before, that a still more accurate investigation proved the
accused to have been really guilty. Would this make any difference
in the guilt of the accusers? Clearly not; the question is not
whether their belief was true or false, but whether they
entertained it on wrong grounds."
This involves the same reasoning as in
Note 4. Text.
Note 8: "And
they might be believed, but they would not thereby become
honourable men. They would not be innocent, they would only be not
found out."
It seems fair and relevant to remark that
this is the situation in which most politicians and priests are:
What such men claim is rarely rational and reasonable, and usually
manufactured either by wishful thinking or deceit. Text.
Note 9: "Every
one of them, if he chose to examine himself in foro
conscientiae, would know that he had acquired and nourished a
belief, when he had no right to believe on such evidence as was
before him; and therein he would know that he had done a wrong
thing."
This I doubt in general, though it is true
for rational and reasonable men. But then many men have strong
beliefs that dispose them to disregard evidence.
For one example, not being a Catholic I
believe the pope is mistaken on many matters of faith he believes
he is right about. But I also believe that he will not see many
matters as I do until and unless he gives up Catholicism. And
conversely, the pope will think similarly about unbelievers like
me.
For another example, there are quite a
large number of personal judgments that are both important to
oneself and not merely judged by one's standards of rationality
and reason, and these concern such matters as whom one loves, what
one likes, and what one's personal ends are.
These matters seem to be more a matter of
personal desire than of personal belief, though it is also true
that personal desires when combined with beliefs about the reality
the desires are meant to be realized in can be both tested by
testing the beliefs they are combined with, and can be tested as
to whether they are practicable and have a tendency to succeed
when practised. Text.
Note 10: "It
may be said, however, that in both these supposed cases it is not
the belief which is judged to be wrong, but the action following
upon it."
Here is a somewhat subtle point that
Clifford will try to settle by insisting that a person's actions
and a person's beliefs are intertwined much like effect and cause:
- What one consciously and deliberately
does and does not do depends on what one believes that will -
probably - result from one's acts, and this in turn depends on
what one believes in general about one's situation and place in
it. Text.
Note 11: "In
the first place, let us admit that, so far as it goes, this view
of the case is right and necessary; right, because even when a
man's belief is so fixed that he cannot think otherwise, he still
has a choice in the action suggested by it, and so cannot escape
the duty of investigating on the ground of the strength of his
convictions; and necessary, because those who are not yet capable
of controlling their feelings and thoughts must have a plain rule
dealing with overt acts."
This refers to the point made and quoted
in Note 10, and involves the relations
between belief and action. As I pointed out there, I agree
that one's acts and one's beliefs interdepend, in the sense that
one will tend to try to do what one believes serves one's
interests and
one will tend not to try to do what one believes does not serve
one's interests, but it seems also to me that there is a faculty
of willing or deciding that intermediates between one's beliefs
and desires on the one hand, and one's actions on the other hand.
The reason to assume such a faculty of willing or deciding,
that operates independently of the faculties of believing and
desiring, though informed by them, rather like a judge is supposed
to be independent from the prosecution and defense, but informed
by them, is that experience teaches that one always, if perhaps
perversely or against one's own interests as one conceives of
these, may decide to try to do the less probable than the more
probable or the less desirable rather than the more desirable.
Text.
Note 12: "But
this being premised as necessary, it becomes clear that it is not
sufficient, and that our previous judgment is required to
supplement it. For it is not possible so to sever the belief from
the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning
the other. No man holding a strong belief on one side of a
question, or even wishing to hold a belief on one side, can
investigate it with such fairness and completeness as if he were
really in doubt and unbiased; so that the existence of a belief
not founded on fair inquiry unfits a man for the performance of
this necessary duty."
Yes, but here the point I made in
Note 9 enters. It may be made in general
terms as follows:
It seems a plain matter of fact that the
vast majority of men is not able or not willing to
judge quite a few matters without bias, and fairly, completely,
rationally and reasonably. And these are especially those matters
about which they have strong religious or political prejudices, or
in which they have a strong personal interest. Text.
Note 13: "Nor is
it that truly a belief at all which has not some influence upon
the actions of him who holds it."
This sounds much like Peirce, who made a
similar point three years earlier than Clifford did, in "How to
make out ideas clear".
Even so, it seems a slight exaggeration,
in that everybody may have beliefs about remote things - the
backside of the moon, the state of the world in 500 years, the
teachings of faiths one anyway disbelieves - that may have little
or no influence on one's acts.
But in general the relation between acts
and beliefs seems to be as sketched in Notes
10 and 11. Text.
Note 14: "He who
truly believes that which prompts him to an action has looked upon
the action to lust after it, he has committed it already in his
heart. If a belief is not realized immediately in open deeds, it
is stored up for the guidance of the future. It goes to make a
part of that aggregate of beliefs which is the link between
sensation and action at every moment of all our lives, and which
is so organized and compacted together that no part of it can be
isolated from the rest, but every new addition modifies the
structure of the whole."
Put otherwise: Whatever specific belief
one has at any moment depends on all one's beliefs on that moment.
The reason is that it might and indeed would be different if some
of ones other beliefs that entered into this particular belief
were different - and the same holds again for these other beliefs.
However, it does not depend on all one's
beliefs to the same extent nor in the same way: If one is rational
the influence of one belief on another will depend on whether or
not both are implied by some theory one holds, and on the
probabilistic degree of relevance of the one belief to the other,
which is a measure of the difference the truth of the one makes to
the probability of the other. Text.
Note 15: "No real
belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, i ever truly
insignificant; it prepares us to receive more of its like,
confirms those which resembled it before, and weakens others; and
so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts,
which may someday explode into overt action, and leave its stamp
upon our character for ever."
The reason was given in
Note 14, including the qualification that not all beliefs
one has at any moment are equally relevant to any specific belief
one has at that moment.
Text.
Note 16: "And
no one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns
himself alone. Our lives our guided by that general conception of
the course of things which has been created by society for social
purposes. Our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and
modes of thought, are common property, fashioned and perfected
from age to age; an heirloom which every succeeding generation
inherits as a precious deposit and a sacred trust to be handled on
to the next one, not unchanged but enlarged and purified, with
some clear marks of its proper handiwork."
No, not quite. For one thing, I don't
believe that "no
one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns
himself alone" and I also don't believe that "Our
words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought,
are common property".
As to the first point I don't believe:
Consider one man's love for his wife, and
suppose it to be sincere, great, romantic, and an inspiration for
him to do many things I hold good and admirable. Should it matter
to me that I don't love his wife in the same way as he does, and
that I therefore don't feel inspired like he does?
In short: This seems to me a good example
of personal tastes, preferences and beliefs that are fairly
considered to be personal and one which is best considered private
- always in so far as these private beliefs do not seriously and
evidently effect the chances for health and happiness of others.
As to the second point I don't believe:
One lives in society in order to further
one's own and other's chances on health and happiness by
cooperation, and this entails quite a few duties and rights - but
not such as to make one's acts, or words, or ideas "common
property". Text.
Note 17: "Into
this, for good or ill, is woven every belief of every man who has
speech of his fellows. An awful privilege, and an awful
responsibility, that we should help to create the world in which
posterity will live."
I agree with the sentiment, but feel it is
here a bit exaggerated.
However, what seems true is that this privilege and this
responsiblity are both more or less proportionate to one's
talents.
Text.
Note 18: "In
the two supposed cases which have been considered, it has been
judged wrong to believe on insufficient evidence, or to nourish
belief by suppressing doubts and avoiding investigation. The
reason of this judgment is not far to seek: it is that in both
these cases the belief held by one man was of great importance to
other men. But forasmuch as no belief held by one man, however
seemingly trivial the belief, and however obscure the believer, is
ever actually insignificant or without its effect on the fate of
mankind, we have no choice but to extend our judgment to all cases
of belief whatever."
With provisos, to be sure:
Whether you believe the soup is better
with a little more salt, or that your shoes are nicer than mine,
seems less important than your beliefs about physics or politics -
and if you are not a person of great intelligence who has given
himself much trouble to make your opinions about physics or
politics rational and reasonable, then
I may act wisely about
your beliefs concerning physics or
politics, while holding them of more importance than those you
hold about your soup or my shoes, by not giving much attention to
them.
In short: Not all beliefs of all persons
are equally important or relevant, and there is a considerable
amount of personal opinions and tastes that are best considered
private in most circumstances, indeed because, whatever they are,
they will not materially influence the chances of most or all
other men for health and happiness. Text.
Note 19: "Belief,
that sacred faculty which prompts the decisions of our will, and
knits into harmonious working all the compacted energies of our
being, is ours not for ourselves but for humanity."
Here lie two fundamental points of
principle: First: Is it belief that prompts the decisions
of our will? And second: Are our beliefs for humanity but
not for ourselves?
As to what prompts the decisions of our
will:
I do not believe one's beliefs "prompt"
these, but I do believe one's beliefs guide and constrain one's
decisions - which are prompted by one's will, which is a separate
faculty apart and independent from one's beliefs, as is shown by
the fact that one can always, possibly perversely, decide and will
to act counter to what one believes is right.
As to whether our beliefs are for humanity
or ourselves:
It seems to me our beliefs are important
to others to the extent that we could and should rationally have
known that they are relevant to another's chances of harm or
happiness, but that quite often we cannot rationally know so, and
also that each of us both lives in his or her own private version
of the world we all live in, and has a freedom to act and believe,
and acts and believes both for his own interests and those of
others.
But it is easy to be seduced into
totalitarianism, and so - with the evidence about totalitarianism
in the 20th Century - I am a little careful with claims of acts
supposedly "not for ourselves but for
humanity"
Text.
Note 20: "Whoso
would deserve well of his fellows in this matter will guard the
purity of his beliefs with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest
at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and catch a
stain which can never be wiped away."
The problem is that - as the world tends
to be - generally one's fellows will not praise one because one is
rational and reasonable but because one is like them and one
supports their prejudices.
So I would like to rephrase this as: Whoso
would deserve a rational and reasonable self-respect, etc. Text.
Note 21: "It
is not only the leader of men, statesmen, philosopher, or poet,
that owes this bounden duty to mankind. Every rustic who delivers
in the village alehouse his slow, infrequent sentences, may help
to kill or keep alive the fatal superstitions which clog his race.
Every hard-worked wife of an artisan may transmit to her children
beliefs which shall knit society together, or rend it in pieces.
No simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the
universal duty of questioning all that we believe."
Again, this seems to me a little
exaggerated. One may fairly require of all men and women that they
be rational and reasonable in all their beliefs and acts - but
one should know the capacities of all men and women to be so vary a
lot, and that one should in general require and expect no more than another
is capable of.
Another relevant consideration, apart from
ability and opportunity, is that one often is pressed for time,
and forced to make choices, and indeed forced to make these
choices also in far less ideal, quiet and unconstrained
circumstances than one believes their importance merits.
Finally, if indeed most men and women live
lifes constrained by all manner of pressures and difficulties, it
seems more just to require them to be reasonable - to treat others
fairly, justly and kindly - and try to be happy, since most
misdeeds are committed by unhappy people, rather than that they
try to be rational,
since this last demand requires much in the way of intelligence,
opportunity and effort. And it is easier, usually, to be
reasonable than to be rational, just as it is usually easier to be
kind than clever. Text.
Note 22: "It is
true that this duty is a hard one, and the doubt which comes out
of itis often a very bitter thing. It leaves us bare and powerless
where we thought that we were safe and strong. To know all about
anything is to know how to deal with it under all circumstances."
It may be fairly doubted that it is
humanly possible "To
know all about anything": All human knowledge is partial,
schematic, incomplete, abstracted from much circumstantial detail,
and based on guess-work.
Also, it is a good moral principle that
"non posse nemo obligatur": What is not possible cannot be a duty
to anyone. (And this also concerns rational thinking.) Text.
Note 23: "But
if the belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence, the
pleasure is a stolen one. Not only does it deceive ourselves by
giving us a sense of power which we do not really possess, but it
is sinful, because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to
mankind."
I suppose one reason for Clifford to write
"sinful"
is to relate it not to one's supposed duties to God but to one's "duty
to mankind". Text.
Note 24: "That
duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from pestilence,
which may shortly master our own body and then spread to the rest
of the town. What would be thought of one who, for the sake of a
sweet fruit, should deliberately run the risk of delivering a
plague upon his family and his neighbours?"
What one could think of is the parallel
with the Bible and original sin. Apart from that, what one should
think of, knowing a little of the history of the 20th C, is of
fascism, communism and other forms of mental and dictatorial
pestilence, which
indeed in the end depended on the individual choices of individual
men and women. Text.
Note 25: "And, as
in other such cases, it is not the risk only which has to be
considered; for a bad action is always bad at the time when it is
done, no matter what happens afterwards. Every time we let
ourselves believe for unworthy reasons, we weaken our powers of
self-control, of doubting, of judicially and fairly weighing
evidence."
And the reason is that "Every
time we let ourselves believe for unworthy reasons" we make
ourselves believe something that is unreasonable and may influence
our other beliefs.
Text.
Note 26: "We all
suffer severely enough from the maintenance and support of false
beliefs and the fatally wrong actions which they lead to, and the
evil born when one such belief is entertained is great and wide.
But a greater and wider evil arises when the credulous character
is maintained and supported, when a habit of believing for
unworthy reasons is fostered and made permanent."
Let's first note
what it is, among other things, that "We
all suffer severely enough from the maintenance and support of
false beliefs and the fatally wrong actions which they lead to":
The millions of iniquities, wasted lifes, persecutions and murders
in the name of some irrational political creed like fascism or
communism, or in the name of some irrational religious creed like
Christianity or Mohammedanism.
To all this and much more Voltaire's
dictum strongly applies:
"If we believe absurdities, we shall commit atrocities."
commit atrocities."
And let's note
what Clifford claims is ultimately the foundation of these many
human horrors and actrocities: "the
credulous character"
- of the sincere followers, the faithful servants, the willing
conformists that actually committed the crimes of fascism,
communism, Christianity, or Mohammedanism. Text.
Note 27: "If I
steal money from any person, there may be no harm done from the
mere transfer of possession; he may not feel the loss, or it may
prevent him from using the money badly. But I cannot help doing
this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself dishonest. What
hurts society is not that it should lose its property, but that it
should become a den of thieves, for then it must cease to be
society. This is why we ought not to do evil, that good may come;
for at any rate this great evil has come, that we have done evil
and are made wicked thereby."
This may sound a little Victorian, but the
underlying reasoning is correct: Both to steal and to believe
something on unworthy evidence is immoral and demoralizes those
who commit these deeds. And indeed, what demoralizes when one
believes things on unworthy evidence is precisely that wherever
this is not due to stupidity it is based on
dishonesty.
Text
Note 28: "In like
manner, if I let myself believe anything on insufficient evidence,
there may be no great harm done by the mere belief; it may be true
after all, or I may never have occasion to exhibit it in outward
acts. But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards Man, that I
make myself credulous. The danger to society is not merely that it
should believe wrong things, though that is great enough; but that
it should become credulous, and lose the habit of testing things
and inquiring into them; for then it must sink back into savagery."
What Clifford is claiming here may be
otherwise put thus: Western societies since the Renaissance and
Galileo have been factually based on science and the technology
this enabled, and they owed their advantages over other types of
societies - such as e.g. better ships and better guns in the
16th, 17th and 18th Centuries - to science.
And science in the end is based on the
spirit of free enquiry, free discussion, logical reasoning and
empirical experimentation. Therefore, indeed it is a danger to a
society thus dependent on science to "become
credulous,
and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them".
Text
Note 29: "The harm
which is done by credulity in a man is not confined to the
fostering of a credulous character in others, and consequent
support of false beliefs. Habitual want of care about what I
believe leads to habitual want of care in others about the truth
of what is told to me. Men speak the truth of one another when
each reveres the truth in his own mind and in the other's mind;
but how shall my friend revere the truth in my mind when I myself
am careless about it, when I believe thing because I want to
believe them, and because they are comforting and pleasant?"
See first Note 28.
I agree with Clifford, but also must note that what he argued for
and I agree with - say: the fundamental social and human
importance of belief founded on rational reasoning and empirical
investigation in a climate of free inquiry and discussion - is
something that seems fit, in actual empirical fact, to a minority
of men and women, namely mostly those who are scientists or whose
outlook is scientific.
And unfortunately so far in any normal
society this type of human being - say: the rational kind - has
been in a minority, even though it is a minority from which most
contributors to science and civilization issued.
Text.
Note 30: "Will he
not learn to cry, "Peace," to me, when there is no peace? By such
a course I shall surround myself with a thick atmosphere of
falsehood and fraud, and in that I must live. It may matter little
to me, in my cloud-castle of sweet illusions and darling lies; but
it matters much to Man that I have made my neighbours ready to
deceive."
Indeed
- but as I remarked in
Note 29 it seems to me an indubitable fact
that the vast majority of men and women everywhere and always seem
to have much preferred to live in "a
thick atmosphere of falsehood and fraud",
in a "cloud-castle
of sweet illusions and darling lies"
- and one reason was that the vast majority of their neighbours
likewise much preferred this, and were willing to force anyone who
dared deviate from the social norms and practices back into
conformity, or into a madhouse or a grave.
Text.
Note 31: "The
credulous man is father to the liar and the cheat; he lives in the
bosom of this his family, and it is no marvel if he should become
even as they are."
Yes indeed - but let us be honest and
clearminded enough to admit that the "credulous
man" so far always and everywhere
formed the majority, and was proud to be credulous, and quite
willing to persecute anyone who was not.
Here are a few relevant statistics about
the late 20th century, more than 100 years after Clifford wrote:
"The scientific world
view is very rare. My guess is that at least 99% of all
currently living human adults have a non-scientific world view
and way of thinking. Most people probably base their lives on
religion and/or magic. (..) let me amuse the reader by
mentioning some results a Gallup investigation conducted in the
U.S. in 1978 produced. According to it, 57% of all Americans
believe in ufos, 54% in angels, 51% in ESP, 39% in devils, 37%
in precognition, 29% in astrology, 24% in clairvoyance, and
(only!) 11% in ghosts." (pag. 226 van R. Tuomela, "Science,
Action, and Reality", D. Reidel Pub.
Comp. 1985, ISBN 90-277-2098-3.)
And let's also note that 2500 years before
Clifford wrote the Buddha already noticed this: "Stupidity and
egoism are the roots of all vice".
Text.
Note 32: "To sum
up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe
anything upon insufficient evidence."
And here we have arrived at Clifford's
dictum, which deserves to be cast in stone above the entries of
all schools and universities, even if it is too demanding an ideal
to practice always, like most ideals, and because it is at least
an ideal of rationality and reason, and not of faith or
politics.
Also, it is not hard to indicate the fair
exceptions to his rule:
- Those beliefs that when acted upon have
consequences that are limited to oneself
- Those beliefs that are based on
personal preferences
- Those beliefs that are forced by
circumstances
I am imprecize here, but this cannot be avoided. Here are
a few precisifications:
The beliefs with consequences limited to oneself are
excepted just because and to the extent one is oneself the only possible
victim of one's false beliefs. The beliefs based on personal
preferences are excepted because one's likes and dislikes are
not only and often not much dependent on one's beliefs, while in any
case what is not excepted are the plans and proposals motivated by
one's likes and dislikes, for these are beliefs like other beliefs, and require
rational scrutinity by oneself and others. And the beliefs
forced by circumstances mostly have to do with time-pressures
and insufficient information: Here and now one must - for example
- either operate the patient or wait for more information with the
chance that the patient dies.
And in any case: Though there are exceptions to Clifford's
dictum, and though the principles it embodies are ideal rather
than always practicable, the exceptions are exceptions
only, and ought to be rationally argued when made an exception.
Apart from this: "it
is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything
upon insufficient evidence."
And to supplement this with a positive
injunction:
It is always right to try to think rationally and try to act
reasonably.
Text.
Note 33: "If a
man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or
persuaded of afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts
which arise about it in his mind, purposely avoids the reading of
books and the company of men that call into question or discuss
it, and regards as impious those questions which cannot easily be
asked without disturbing it--the life of that man is one long sin
against mankind"
Obviously, as quite a few others of
Clifford's remarks, this is directed against religion as it is
normally believed and practised. And indeed, most faithful
believers of most religions have tended to be believe it is
"impious (to ask) those questions which
cannot easily be asked without disturbing it--the life of that man
is one long sin against mankind" and thus have insisted
that people led lifes that were, according to Clifford's
standards, "one long sin against mankind".
But then Clifford is right that religion as
it is normally practised and believed is not compatible with
rationality, science or indeed the ideal of only trying to believe
what is worthy of belief in a rational sense. Text.
Note 34:
A man may be a heretic
in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor
says so, or the assembly so determine, without knowing other
reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds
becomes his heresy.
This is from Milton, but it means little
more than that followers and conformists have handed over their
own judgments to their leaders or role-models, have ceased to
judge for themselves, and therefore can not be relied upon as
independent witnesses or thinkers, and run the same cognitive
risks as those they imitate.
Text.
Note 35:
He who begins by loving
Christianity better than Truth, will proceed by loving his own
sect or Church better than Christianity, and end loving himself
better than all.
This is from Coleridge, and it should be
added that the vast majority of virtually all religious and
political creeds love their own creed, their own leaders, and
their own group far better than truth or rationality or indeed
morals, for here also fits a very pertinent quotation from Orwell,
with my stresses:
"Actions are held to be good or bad,
not on their own merits but according to who does them, and
there is almost no outrage - torture, the use of hostages,
forced labour, mass deportations, imprisonments without trial,
forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians, which does not
change its moral colour when it is committed by 'our' side." (The
Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell,
vol 3, p. 419, written in May 1945.)
Unfortunately,
so far in human history rational and reasonable men and women have
been in a small minority - though it was the minority that
elevated all of mankind from bestiality and primitiveness, and
that discovered or invented science and civilization, and handed
it through to posterity.
Text.
Note 36: "Inquiry
into the evidence of a doctrine is not to be made once for all,
and then taken as finally settled. It is never lawful to stifle a
doubt; for either it can be honestly answered by means of the
inquiry already made, or else it proves that the inquiry was not
complete."
Precisely, except that I would have said
"moral" or "rational" rather than "lawful". And again Clifford
seems to be in part argueing against the religiously faithful of
his time, for these held the opposite doctrine mostly.
Text.
Note 37:
" "But," says one, "I am a busy man; I have
no time for the long course of study which would be necessary to
make me in any degree a competent judge of certain questions, or
even able to understand the nature of the arguments."
Then he should have no
time to believe."
Perhaps so - but he may have little choice
in believing as he does, being placed as he is. So what's more
relevant and important:
You may believe as you please -
indeed, you will tend to do so anwyay - but you may
not act upon such non-rationally founded beliefs as are important to the chances of
health or happiness of others, nor may you insist that your beliefs are
more important than the trouble you have given yourself to give
them a rational foundation. Mere faith is not enough, especially
not where it effects the chances of others.
Text.
