In fact, continuing
the trend of my last
remark, there is the following specification of what makes a statement
of propositional attitude and its contained proposition true:
(1) ("a")("A")("p")("aAp
&
p" is True iff

(EW)(Ea)(Ep)(EM)(EA)(E'a')(E'A')(E'p')

("a"S'a' & "A"S'A' & "p"S'p' &

'a'RM & 'A'RA & 'p'Rp &

Mea & aeW & AeM &

'aAp'eA & "aAp"eW &

peW)

This may be read thus:

A propositional
attitude
"aAp
& p" is true iff there are a world W, a body a, a fact p, a mind M,
an attitude A, an idea of a person 'a', an idea of an attitude 'A', an
idea of a fact 'p' such that "a" symbolizes the idea of a person 'a',
"A" symbolizes the idea of an attitude 'A', "p" symbolizes the idea of
a fact 'p', the idea of a person 'a' represents the mind M, the idea of
an attitude 'A' represents the attitude A, the idea of a fact 'p'
represents the fact p, the mind M is in the body a, the body a is in
the world W, the attitude A is in the mind M, the idea that 'a has A to
p' is in the attitude, the expression "aAp" is in the world, and the
fact p is in the world.

Here is a picture in a form
of
a table to show the relations of containment:

The following remarks need
to
be made

- The relation (S) or
**symbolizes**
is a map from language L to meanings M
- The relation (R) or
**represents**
is as explained below
- It is assumed that if
"aAp"
is
**in a world**, so are "a", "A" and "p"
- It is assumed that if
'aAp'
is
**in a mind**, so are 'a', 'A' and 'p'
- That the idea of a
person
represents a mind seems most natural
- That the idea of a fact
represents a fact does
**not** entail the fact exists:
- If a represented fact
does
not exist what 'p' represents is 'p', else it is p
- That the mind is in the
body does not necessarily entail it is a part of it, and
- The same holds for the
elements of a mind viz. its attitudes and ideas
- Apart from the fact p
being
in W, all the rest is required for understanding "aAp"

The argument about the
Cogito
I gave in my comments to the previous Cartesian Meditation holds, with
some suitable re-wording, and nothing that is said in the present note
proves materialism or physicalism, since that depends on how one
fleshes out the hypothesis of a mind.

But as the picture shows,
one
may take W which includes a and p as **common sense reality with
bodies and facts**, and take M as a hypothetical theoretical term or
as something that is inside a and not open to inspection in the common
sense world. And indeed, one **may** take M as - part of - the **brain**
of a.

It is most natural to say
that **the idea of a person** represents its mind (which is **in**
or at least **of** a body), and that a mind is made up of **memories**
and **capacities to abstract and combine ideas**.

Also, the hypothesis of a
mind
is based in part on the supposed fact that **experiences** are **private**
(and in some sense 'in' or 'of' bodies), and in part on the allowance
to introduce **theoretical entities** that account for experienced
facts - which is much like assuming a backside and an inside when one
sees a front side of something.

And it is helpful in the
above
to introduce 'b(a)' for 'body of a', to distinguish it from 'a' for
'mind of body of a'.

Finally, there is a type
of
propositional attitude that differs from the standard ones that allow
that either aAp & p or aAp & ~p, and which is self-validating
in a way, namely feelings:

(2) f(b(a)) iff aF(f(b(a)))

That is: there are states
of
the body of a person that the person **feels** iff the states exist
(**provided** the person's mind works properly - which is not the
case, for example, in cases of pains in - amputated - phantom limbs).

The explanation of '**Represents**'
is as follows, in terms of set-theory and the additional notion of an
index of a class (which is essentially a mapping of the class to a
subset of the class), and supposing that the class X is a class of
structures that are represented as n-ary relations:

Let X be a class, then
j:X* is
an index of X iff X* is a subset of X and j:X=>X* with dom(j)=X and
ran(j)=X*. Now suppose j:X* is an index of X. Then

j:X* represents X iff

(ReX)(x1eX)...(xneX)((R(x1,..,xn)eX iff j(R)(j(x1),...,j(xn))) e X*.

Note that X is in fact
supposed to be **a class of relations or structures**. Also, j(R)
and j(xi) are in j:X* by definition. And so j:X* r X iff (x)(R) [
j(R)(..j(x)..)eX* iff R(..x..)eX ].

A related notion is a **valuation**
by an index class: If the index class j:X* is such that X*={0,{X}} and
j:X* r X iff (x)(R) [ j[R(..x)..)]=X iff R(..x..)eX ]. This represents
negation iff j:X* r X iff (x)(R) [ j[not R(..x)..)]=X iff ~(R(..x..)eX)
]. Note a valuation is not from the structures of X to a subset of
structures of X but to a subset of its powerset.

Also, with the above
understanding my reconstruction of Descartes' "Cogito" remains valid,
but can be seen to be rather trivial: When propositional attitudes are
used, minds of persons and experiences of ideas are presumed in some
way, as hypothetical theoretical entities that may be fleshed out in
several different ways.

This seems to me **much**
clearer
that what Descartes offers.

The problem with Descartes
is
that he seems to have painted himself in a very small corner, with **only**
unreliable mental experiences and language. Also, the "me" he takes his
perceptions and imaginations to reside in is mysterious.